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Crossing the Green Line: 
Anti-Settler Sentiment in Cyprus
Adrienne Christiansen
Just seconds from the main airport exit in Larnaca, Cyprus, a large 
new permanent sign greets thousands of daily tourists and visitors. 
It reads: WE DEMAND ALL TURKISH TROOPS AND SETTLERS 
LEAVE CYPRUS. Standing in stark contrast to the norms of hospital-
ity for which the country is justly famous, the sign announces that all 
is not well on Aphrodite’s island. Unfortunately, the airport message 
is no anomaly; rather, it is a harbinger of anti-immigrant sentiment 
that permeates Cyprus. An older, rusted but identical sign is located at 
another popular tourist site, the Ledra Palace checkpoint on the “Green 
Line” in downtown Lefkosia.1
Given their attempt to evoke attention and sympathy from tour-
ists, the signs at the airport and the Green Line are comparatively 
mild in their insistence that Turkish immigrants, commonly referred 
to as “settlers,” be expelled from Cyprus. Pejorative and inflammatory 
statements against this population frequently are printed in the Greek 
Cypriot press. Turkish immigrants commonly are described in news-
paper reports or during informal conversation as dark, dirty, black 
beards, peasants, squatters, interlopers, illegal occupiers, criminals, 
rapists, thieves, drug-dealers, uneducated, poor, unclean, lazy, reli-
gious, gypsies, or even “Anatolian apes.” Anti-immigrant sentiment 
was everywhere when I lived on the island during the fall of 2003.2 
Even the words “settler,” “Turk,” and “Muslim” served as vicious 
epithets. Regardless of whether I was on the north or south side of the 
Green Line, no one in my company flinched upon hearing a settler 
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slur. No one raised objections. No one apologized or muttered half-
heartedly that, “I am no racist, but…”3
Originally, the animus reflected in the anti-Turkish-immigrant talk 
surprised and disturbed me because of its hostile tenor and ubiquity. 
I was accustomed to Americans who try to rhetorically “soften the 
blow” of their racial epithets by denying their bigotry or racial intent. 
Additionally, anti-racist sensibilities and sensitivities in the United 
States have been heightened sufficiently so that racist discourse can 
produce outrage and protest, followed by apologies, heart-felt or not. 
Racism in the United States is still widespread, but racial talk is increas-
ingly policed. Not so in Cyprus.
Over time, I became less surprised by the anti-settler slurs, though 
no less discomforted. As I turned my attention to these denigrating 
discourse practices, I discovered that Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike 
have very good reasons to vigorously oppose the policies that have 
brought between 50,000 and 120,000 mainland Turks to Cyprus in 
the wake of the island’s de facto partition in 1974.4 These immigration 
policies have heightened tensions and prompted political, social, and 
economic dislocations that, even in the best of circumstances, would 
challenge most societies. The conflict over Turkish settlers in northern 
Cyprus is especially potent because it adds highly emotional issues to 
an already tense situation, including human rights violations, refugees’ 
agony, resentments about property losses, anger and humiliation over 
military losses, fears of electoral manipulation, anxieties about cultural 
and demographic displacement, and anger over the perceived “Turki-
fication” of northern Cyprus.
Expressing opposition to a policy and its effects too frequently 
involves denigrating a people—a practice not limited to Cyprus. The 
slurs against Turkish settlers discomforted me in part because they so 
strongly reminded me of the language Americans use to insult both 
African-Americans and immigrants in the United States. My original 
research project was to analyze the rhetoric of Cyprus’ Greek/Turkish 
ethno-nationalist conflict as reflected in political statuary and monu-
ments. But even though I had gone abroad to learn about political 
language practices in a culture that was not my own, I found myself 
unable to ignore slurs against Turkish immigrants, nor their similarity 
to American racial epithets.
Pursuing this project on “anti-settler talk” generates numerous trou-
bling questions and raises ethical dilemmas for me as a scholar new 
to international research. For example, does drawing attention to one 
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of the lesser-known schisms in Cyprus subtly suggest that I believe 
Americans are better than Cypriots in dealing with ethnic and/or racial 
conflicts? After having accepted the warm hospitality of my Cypriot 
hosts for many months, is it unconscionably rude of me to write about 
the derogatory depiction of Turkish settlers in the press and in every-
day talk? Is it possible for me to write about the fascinating rhetorical 
and discursive components of the settler issue without seeming to 
make a moral judgment against people for whom I care deeply? And 
how should I handle the pressures put on me to publicly denounce 
the Turkish military and the Turkish government that sent the immi-
grants to the island in the first place? Can anything I write about this 
topic possibly be read as scholarship rather than an articulation of 
my supposedly “pro-Turkey” bias? After all, merely having attended 
Macalester’s Faculty Development International Seminar in Istanbul 
and expressing interest in the humanitarian plight of Turkish settlers 
has already led to angry and painful denunciations of me by Greek 
Cypriot friends. Lastly, I wonder whether publishing this essay will 
destroy any hope of ever doing research on Cyprus in the future.
Unattractive and difficult as it is to discuss, anti-settler sentiment 
in Cyprus is significant for reasons that both include and go beyond 
moral and humanitarian considerations. What appears on its face to 
be “simple” racist speech is considerably more complex. The anti-set-
tler slurs symbolically capture important political issues on Cyprus. In 
particular, the sign outside the Larnaca airport succinctly articulates 
two of the most entrenched barriers to diplomatic reunification efforts 
on the island.5 The sign also provides a glimpse into simmering demo-
graphic and multicultural politics that divide the island, demograph-
ics that extend beyond the more familiar conflict between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots. Perhaps most importantly, the pejorative discourse 
about Turkish settlers cannot be dismissed as a case of historic hatreds 
or cross-ethnic animosities, for slurs against Turkish immigrants are 
echoed on both sides of the island. That is, Greek Cypriots talk about 
the settlers in ways nearly identical to how Turkish Cypriots talk about 
Turkish settlers. Signs demanding that Turkish troops and settlers leave 
the island might easily be found at Ercan Airport in the north were it 
not for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) oppressive 
squelching of dissent and critique of its policies, combined with terror-
ist threats from fascist groups like the notorious “Grey Wolves.”6 As 
such, the racist slurs against Turkish settlers confound easy notions of 
identity politics and underscore the reality that racist speech is often 
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not about race, but also (or instead) reflects fears—of difference, or 
political, social, and economic changes.
In this essay, I briefly examine Cyprus’ modern history and the 
political policies that led to large numbers of Turkish immigrants mov-
ing to the island in order to draw attention to an important aspect of 
the “Cyprus problem” that frequently goes unnoticed because it is 
overshadowed by the more familiar ethno-nationalist conflict between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots.7 Anti-settler talk in Cyprus reminds us 
that discriminatory social and political practices almost always occur 
in an environment that is also rich in linguistic derogation and scape-
goating. In this case, the discursive “Green Line” between Greeks and 
Turks has disappeared, thus creating space for unusually rare com-
mon ground. Unfortunately, that shared discursive space comes at the 
expense of desperately poor and underprivileged Turkish immigrants 
who are caught in their own version of “no man’s land.”
*****
To better understand the conditions leading to the wide array of slurs 
against Turkish settlers, one must first understand the historical and 
political exigencies that brought these immigrants to the island in the 
first place. The historical record demonstrates definitively that “others” 
have been coming to, and settling in, Cyprus for thousands of years. In 
this sense, the Turkish settler issue must be seen as a part of broader 
historical phenomena on the island. Due to its rich resources like cop-
per and agricultural produce, as well as its geostrategic location at 
the crossroads of Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East, Cyprus 
has been attractive to a host of foreign conquerors with multiple inva-
sions the result. According to political scientist Joseph Joseph, Cyprus 
“has been ruled by Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Ptolemies, Romans, 
Byzantines, Franks, Venetians, Ottoman Turks, and British.”8 Turk-
ish control over northern Cyprus in the 1970s is only the most recent 
example of this historical pattern. Each of these conquerors brought 
administrators and immigrants and each left their distinctive marks on 
the island’s politics, language, religion, architecture, art, and culture.
The Cyprus problem frequently is treated as a conflict between two 
homogenous, distinctive, and entirely antagonistic ethnic groups. But 
the contemporary wrangling over the island by British, Greek, and 
Turkish forces makes clear that the Cyprus problem is also a dispute 
over military and economic control by foreign powers that have inter-
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vened in what they believe to be their own national interests.9 To be 
sure, identity politics roil the island, but in ways that go far beyond the 
familiar ethno-nationalist conflict that typically draws the attention of 
scholars, diplomats, and reporters. Instead, I want to suggest that the 
struggle over the role of Turkish settlers reflects broad multicultural 
changes occurring all over the island.
Cyprus’ ethnic makeup has taken on ever-increasingly diverse hues 
in the past several decades for reasons entirely separate from the issue 
of Turkish settlers in the north. Especially in light of its booming tour-
ism industry, its serving as a place of refuge for people fleeing war or 
political upheaval, and its immigration policies on foreign workers, 
Cyprus has clearly entered a “multicultural age” with its concomi-
tant pressures. For example, of the 2.5 million tourists who visit the 
island each year, more than half come from Great Britain and more 
than 30,000 Brits live permanently on the island as retired expatriates. 
Moreover, Cyprus has served as a place of refuge for Maronites, Arme-
nians, Lebanese, and Russians, even though such groups frequently 
experience discrimination and believe themselves to be marginalized 
in Cypriot society. In addition, during the past two decades, Greek 
Cypriots have brought migrant construction and domestic workers 
by the tens of thousands from countries like Thailand, Sri Lanka and 
the Philippines.10 In northern Cyprus, several hundred registered sex 
workers known as “konsomatrices” are imported from “Eastern Euro-
pean nations, primarily from Moldavia, Ukraine, Belarus and Roma-
nia.”11 Like foreign construction and domestic workers in the south, 
sex workers may not become citizens or even stay in the TRNC for 
more than six months. Thus, even if there were no Turkish settlers in 
the north, Cypriots would still be struggling with issues of enormous 
economic disparities on the island, nationalism, and how to maintain 
(or even define) their self-perceived “Cypriotness” during a time of 
increasing multicultural influences.12 Cyprus’ recent accession to the 
European Union and opening its borders to other Europeans will make 
these economic, identity, and multicultural pressures even more pro-
nounced in the future.
*****
Who are the Turkish settlers who evoke widespread disparagement 
and why did they come to Cyprus? To answer these questions, one 
must recall several significant historical moments that led to the cata-
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strophic events of 1974.13 In the 1950s, Greek Cypriots, with the sup-
port of Greece and the Greek Orthodox Church, began a guerilla war 
against British authority in Cyprus. Independence from Britain was 
merely the first step in fulfilling the Greek Cypriot goal, which was 
Enosis or formal union with Greece. Turkish Cypriots feared that Enosis 
would lead to annihilation by their historic Greek enemies. Conse-
quently, Turkish Cypriots advocated a policy of complete separation, 
known as Taksim. Britain manipulated ethnic tensions between Greeks 
and Turks on the island in order to blunt the Greek Cypriots’ military 
success and to enlist the aid of Turkish Cypriots in the guerilla war. 
Greek Cypriots ultimately were successful in wresting control from 
Great Britain and won the country’s independence, but they did not 
fulfill their final aim of Enosis. With no representation from the “moth-
erlands” of Greece or Turkey, Britain designed and imposed a constitu-
tion that ultimately proved to be unworkable but that protected Great 
Britain’s sovereign military bases and other geostrategic interests on 
the island. Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain signed a Treaty of Guar-
antee insuring the independence of Cyprus, its security, and its territo-
rial integrity. In so doing, the newly independent Cyprus and the other 
international players agreed to relinquish pursuit of Enosis or Taksim 
policies.
Between 1963 and 1967, following a constitutional crisis in which 
the democratically elected President (and Greek Archbishop) Makarios 
suggested thirteen revisions that would limit Turkish Cypriot politi-
cal power, separate municipalities began to develop in Cyprus’ five 
main cities.14 Intense inter-ethnic violence also broke out, resulting in 
more than 400 dead Turkish Cypriots and more than 200 dead Greek 
Cypriots. Approximately 25,000 Turkish Cypriots withdrew into four 
defended enclaves during this time.
In 1968, the Greek military junta in Athens joined with Greek 
Cypriot nationalists called EOKA-B and authorized a coup against 
President Makarios. Makarios had once been a strong supporter of 
Enosis with Greece, but by 1968 had come to believe that Enosis was an 
unrealistic goal and that it was unwise to commingle Cyprus’ political 
interests with that of the Greek military dictatorship. His caution was 
warranted, but it also angered the Greek junta. On July 15, 1974, the 
coupists attacked the presidential palace in Lefkosia, killing approxi-
mately 3,000 Greek Cypriots and prompting President Makarios to flee 
to Britain. Five days later, using as justification their role as a guaran-
tor power as well as the protection of the Turkish Cypriot population 
Macalester International  Vol. 15
160
from genocide, 40,000 Turkish soldiers and paratroopers invaded in 
a military campaign called the “Attila Operation” (later renamed the 
“Peace Operation”). Irregular Turkish Cypriot soldiers joined them 
and together they fought the badly outnumbered Greek and Greek 
Cypriot forces.
The Turkish military’s presence, combined with atrocities they com-
mitted against the Greek civilian population, prompted approximately 
162,000 Greek Cypriots to flee their homes in northern Cyprus with lit-
tle more than the clothes on their backs. In retaliation, Greek Cypriots 
rounded up thousands of Turkish Cypriots living in southern Cyprus 
and herded them into soccer stadiums and similar holding facili-
ties. Afraid of their Greek Cypriot captors and pressured by Turkish 
authorities to move north, approximately 50,000 Turkish Cypriots fled 
their homes and moved within the next twelve months. By the time a 
ceasefire was called on August 16, 1974, more than 6,000 Greek Cypri-
ots had died, approximately 1,500 Turkish Cypriots had died, and the 
Turkish Army occupied 36% of Cyprus’ territory. Both sides had large 
numbers of missing soldiers and citizens, an issue that would come 
to dominate the political scene in southern Cyprus for the next thirty 
years. Nearly one-third of the Cypriot population, both Greek and 
Turk, were now refugees in their own country. The island effectively 
had been partitioned into two ethnic zones.
Although Turkish authorities refer to it as a “population exchange” 
and the Republic of Cyprus authorities call it “ethnic cleansing,” one 
effect of Turkey’s military action was to almost entirely empty north-
ern Cyprus of its Greek Cypriot population. In 1974, Turkish Cypriots 
comprised only about 18% of the country’s census and they chafed 
under their minority status and political impotence. Even with the 
arrival of 50,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south who were 
given a place to live, tens of thousands of Greek Cypriot homes, flats, 
and properties in northern Cyprus stood abandoned, victim to the rav-
ages of war. Almost as soon as the Turkish Army consolidated its ter-
ritorial holdings, Turkish mainlanders began arriving on Cyprus.
Why did Turkish settlers come to the island in the first place? The 
short answer is that they were invited and encouraged to do so. Turk-
ish Cypriot journalist Sevgul Uludag answers this question in a 2004 
column in which she highlighted the wretched living conditions suf-
fered by settlers in Lefkosia, the northern Cypriot capitol: “Why were 
they here? We know they are here because of the policies of Ankara. 
Because they are looking for a better life. People are moving all over 
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the world in search of a better life. In search of better options for their 
kids. In search of getting more out of life.”15 Entirely different are the 
issues that prompted the government in Ankara and the authorities 
in the TRNC to extend invitations to Turkish mainlanders. Gilles Ber-
trand explains:
The first and official reason was to replace Greek Cypriot manpower in 
the agricultural sector of the new northern zone. But the other reason 
was to increase the ‘Turkish’ population in the island, to change the 
demographic balance in order to negotiate later a better political repre-
sentation for Turkish Cypriots, in case of an agreement. Thirdly, Turkish 
settlers have been sent to achieve the ‘integration’ of Turkish Cypriots 
into Turkish culture and nationalism. For all these reasons, the first set-
tlers were veterans of the intervention and people from Central Anatolia, 
one of Turkey’s most nationalist regions.16
To make Cyprus attractive to potential settlers, immigrants were 
given animals, money, land, and homes that were owned by Greek 
Cypriots who had fled to the south. Many settlers were also given citi-
zenship rights mere days after arriving on the island, contravening the 
TRNC’s policy of requiring residency for five years.
It is not surprising that many Greek Cypriots denigrate Turkish 
immigrants in the press and in daily conversations. Given the number 
of Greek deaths following the Turkish military operation, the destruc-
tion of their communities, churches, and cultural artifacts, and the lack 
of access to their property or compensation for nearly thirty years, 
Greek Cypriots tend to loathe the settlers who have benefited at their 
expense. After all, the settlers live in their homes and farm their land. 
The settlers symbolically represent the very embodiment of Greek 
Cypriots’ fears, losses, resentments, and humiliation at the hands of 
the Turkish military.
More surprising is the denigration of Turkish immigrants by Turk-
ish Cypriots. On the surface, one might expect Turkish Cypriots to 
have warm sentiments toward the Turkish immigrants with whom 
they share a cultural heritage, at least in name. Cyprus lies only 40 
miles from Turkey’s southern border. But differences in dress, dialect, 
social attitudes, family size, and religious practices served to create 
wide divisions between the two groups. Because of their dire pov-
erty, some Turkish immigrants turned to criminal activity upon arriv-
ing in Cyprus, and thereby created the conditions leading to charges 
that all settlers were criminals. Because of their religious conservatism, 
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immigrants filled mosques and built minarets throughout rural north-
ern Cyprus, in stark contrast to the highly secular Turkish Cypriots. 
Because they knew that they were living in homes that did not legally 
belong to them, many immigrants failed to make improvements to 
the properties they were given, thereby feeding attitudes that they 
were lazy, unkempt, or indifferent to their surroundings. Because they 
came in large numbers and were willing to work for little money, the 
immigrants put downward pressure on salaries, and thereby dimin-
ished economic opportunities for the more highly educated Turkish 
Cypriots. Because they were physically and psychologically threat-
ened at election time by Turkish soldiers, who noted that they could 
be sent back to Turkey at any time,17 the immigrants historically voted 
for Rauf Denktash and the reigning political authority.18 Denktash has 
been President of the TRNC since 1974 and was, therefore, responsible 
for inviting settlers to the island, providing them with resources, and 
granting them citizenship rights.
In spite of their seemingly favored alliance with the political leader-
ship of the TRNC, many Turkish immigrants lead very difficult lives. 
According to one human rights leader with whom I spoke, settlers 
tend to live in rural villages that are strictly divided between Turk-
ish Cypriots and Turkish immigrants. Settlers’ children frequently go 
to segregated schools and are discouraged from playing with other 
children. Settlers receive low wages and their properties too often 
lack electricity or adequate water supplies, even in the capital city of 
Lefkosia.19 Families try to discourage intermarriage between a settler 
and a Turkish Cypriot. One man told me that news of such a marriage 
often is treated like a family dishonor, akin to “announcing that you 
have contracted AIDS.”
Turkish immigrants have few resources in terms of non-governmen-
tal organizations or civil society groups advocating on their behalf. 
History professor Nuri Cevikel was fired from his job at Eastern Medi-
terranean University in Famagusta because he opposed the policies 
of TRNC President Rauf Denktash and organized a group to lobby 
for Turkish settlers’ rights.20 Cevikel was the first member of a Turk-
ish immigrant family to become a lecturer in northern Cyprus and his 
firing demonstrates the precarious political position in which settlers 
find themselves. Even progressive, bi-communal peace organizations, 
which might find common cause with the settlers, tend to ignore the 
settler community. One bi-communal leader reported to me that, “we 
simply don’t allow settlers to participate in our organizations.” In her 
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groundbreaking book The Line: Women, Partition, and the Gender Order 
in Cyprus, Cynthia Cockburn challenges these types of prohibitions on 
the part of progressive organizations. She includes rare interviews with 
three settler women who achingly describe their pain at being socially 
isolated in Cyprus.21 Cockburn also summarizes the work of Sevgul 
Uludag, who has written the only in-depth journalistic accounts of set-
tler life in northern Cyprus:
She [Uludag] found they do not regard themselves as the unitary group 
Turkish Cypriots see them as being. Many identify less with Turkey than 
with the particular region from which they come. They do not all, by 
any means, agree with the right-wing political parties and the deep state 
whose agents they are supposed to be. Many feel insecure, lacking the 
deeds that would give them ownership of homes they have lived in for 
years. They hear rumours they will be deported…many of them are not 
so much beneficiaries as victims in the TRNC.22
Although it is not identical, much of the anti-settler sentiment on the 
part of Turkish Cypriots (like that of Greek Cypriots) grows out of fear 
and resentment. Discomfort with cultural differences such as dress or 
religious practices may well account for some of the discriminatory 
treatment that settlers face at the hands of Turkish Cypriots. More tell-
ingly, though, settlers’ effects on the northern Cypriot economy arouse 
intense anxiety and linguistic denigration. “The first wave of settlers 
were [sic] mostly uneducated laborers. Sadly, they were treated as 
intruders by some Turkish Cypriots who viewed themselves as being 
more European and therefore superior.”23 Mete Hatay, an independent 
researcher in northern Cyprus, underscores the economic dynamic 
between Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish mainlanders in his explana-
tion of the conflict between the two groups:
Turkish Cypriots having been a closed and isolated community for 
years, especially in the 1960s, suddenly found themselves all together 
in the north facing these newcomers and they reacted… . The preju-
dices are mainly a reaction from the petty bourgeois, who, ironically are 
the ones who employ them. The image of this slave labour—the immi-
grant worker—is disturbing their European image, since they claim to 
be European… . Most of these labourers work under extreme conditions, 
up to 15 hours a day without proper accommodation, exploited by Turk-
ish Cypriots and Turkish businessmen.24
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Clearly, economic-based fears play an important role, as these 
quotes attest. Native Cypriots believe that the 30-year international 
trade embargo against the TRNC, combined with the diminishing sala-
ries due to the glut of cheap Turkish migrant labor, forces them to 
emigrate to countries with more favorable economic opportunities. 
“Unless we can join Europe along with the south of the island, my sons 
will go to London…They have no future here. All the youngsters who 
want to do something with their lives, they are leaving.”25 The fear 
of having to leave Cyprus altogether is justified, as the population of 
Turkish Cypriots declined from 118,000 to roughly 87,000 since 1974, 
with most émigrés moving to London or Australia.26 One need only 
compare the disparity in per capita annual incomes between southern 
Cyprus ($12,000) and northern Cyprus ($4,000) to understand what 
fuels Turkish Cypriot emigration patterns and economic anxieties.27
In addition to fear about economic effects, the denigration of Turkish 
immigrants reflects resentment about their political effect, either real 
or imagined. “Turkish Cypriots always discriminate against us. We are 
only remembered at election time,” one woman says.28 Turkish Cypri-
ots understandably chafe at seeing residency requirements waived for 
the Turkish mainlanders who were given citizenship and voting rights 
soon after their arrival on the island. Such practices lead to charges 
that the TRNC government rigs elections29 in order to stay in power 
and maintain the status quo—especially the “satellite state” relation-
ship between northern Cyrus and the Turkish “motherland.” President 
Denktash denies these charges. Moreover, press reports frequently 
focus on Turkish Cypriots’ fear of being outnumbered by settlers and 
of losing their indigenous culture due to demographic changes.30 Given 
the dearth of reliable figures on the numbers of Turkish Cypriots and 
Turkish settlers living in northern Cyprus, it is difficult to establish 
whether or not these genuinely-felt fears are exaggerated. In May 2003, 
however, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe pub-
lished a report highly critical of the TRNC for its policies vis-á-vis Turk-
ish immigrants, which the Assembly called “hidden colonization.” The 
Rapporteur noted that such policies had a “considerable impact on the 
demographic, social and economic structure of the Turkish Cypriot 
community.”31
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*****
Taken by themselves, the derogatory and inflammatory names for 
Turkish immigrants that I listed early in this essay could be read as 
little more than racial bigotry. Cypriots who make such comments 
could be labeled as racist and I might end by lamenting the ubiquity 
of ethnic slurs found around the world.32 Indeed, I do lament eth-
nic slurs, especially when they are used as a substitute for the hard 
work of arguing over policies and their effects. In this essay I have 
endeavored to contextualize the slurs against Turkish settlers in order 
to demonstrate that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots are culpable for 
these unkind and discriminatory linguistic practices. I mean also to 
highlight the good reasons why Cypriots have conflicts with the settlers 
as well as illuminating their poor reasons. In my experiences on both 
sides of the Green Line, I found individuals willing and even eager 
to catalogue their grievances against the “other side,” which include 
duplicity, corruption, war atrocities, mass graves, ethnic cleansing, and 
a host of human rights violations. In contrast, I rarely found Cypriots 
who would speak about their own side’s mistakes. Such courageous 
individuals risk being labeled traitors and incurring the wrath of their 
fellows. In a country like Cyprus, one must take death threats and 
Grey Wolves very seriously.
From my limited vantage point as a foreigner, the ethno-national-
ist conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots became increasingly 
curious and frustrating. The very real suffering that grows out of that 
conflict seems to “breathe up all the air” and thereby leaves little time, 
energy, or resources for others on the island who also suffer. The needs 
of Turkish settlers can be easily dismissed or “trumped.” A Greek 
Cypriot government spokesman recently demonstrated this practice 
when he said, “the issue of settlers was considered a ‘provocation and 
violation of every humanitarian law principle,’ adding that there were 
more serious examples of the violation of human rights in Cyprus, such 
as the refugees situation, ‘which in fact is a clear method of ethnic 
cleansing’ ” (emphasis added).33 “Our pain is simply greater than your 
pain,” the spokesman seems to suggest, and therefore “we do not need 
to pay attention” to the settlers’ pain.
Sadly, Turkish immigrants are caught between the hostility and 
indifference of Greek Cypriots and the discrimination and disdain 
of Turkish Cypriots. Turkish immigrants came to Cyprus as politi-
cal pawns, as human bargaining chips, and to provide backbreak-
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ing labor. Among other reasons, the TRNC government welcomed 
them as a means to consolidate power and to maintain close ties with 
“Mother Turkey,” upon whom northern Cyprus is entirely dependent. 
Ankara was happy to encourage the emigration of Turkish mainland-
ers because they would be “facts on the ground.” In other words, they 
would help to keep Cyprus partitioned and secure Turkey’s claims on 
northern Cyprus’ territory. Given the hardships they face and the ways 
they have been used by their “enemies” and their “friends,” it is sur-
prising that Turkish immigrants want to stay in Cyprus at all. Yet for 
many young settlers and children, Cyprus is the only home they have 
ever known. There is no place outside Cyprus to which they can “go 
back.” That so many of their parents find in Cyprus a better life sug-
gests the degree of hardships they must have faced in Turkey prior to 
emigrating to the island.
Greek and Turkish Cypriots use very similar language to describe 
Turkish immigrants. They share similar fears and resentments. They 
practice a common rhetorical response of scapegoating and “mystify-
ing” those who seem different and threatening. Many Cypriots see 
themselves as modern Europeans and therefore superior to the settlers, 
who are depicted as backwater peasants. Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
are highly secular in contrast to the devoutly religious Sunni Muslims 
who come from mainland Turkey. Both groups of Cypriots treat the 
newcomers as “other” and seek to limit the settlers’ perceived political 
power. Each seems inured to the dire conditions in which many set-
tlers must live. The immigrant’s pains are “trumped” by the pains of 
those Cypriots living on the island prior to 1974. Both groups see the 
settlers as thieves, having stolen their homes and land in the case of 
Greek Cypriots, and having stolen their elections and future in the case 
of Turkish Cypriots. Many Cypriots on both sides of the island want to 
see the settlers go home, wherever that may be, as long as it is not on 
Cyprus.
For nearly thirty years, a combination of land mines, concrete bar-
rels, barriers, barbed wire, and armed soldiers kept Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots apart. Nationalist politicians defined themselves in opposi-
tion to the Cypriots on the other side of the Green Line and urged their 
people to see themselves as ideologically and ethnically homogenous. 
Bi-communal peace groups worked for decades under the most dif-
ficult circumstances to help Cypriots heal the divisions on the island 
and to bring Greek and Turkish Cypriots together. Who would have 
expected that poorly educated and impoverished Turkish immigrants 
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unwittingly have done much to help Greek and Turkish Cypriots see 
their interests as conjoined and not just conflicted? Setters symbolically 
stand as the new “other” against whom Cypriots rhetorically proj-
ect their anxieties. By their presence on the island and the perceived 
threats they pose, Turkish immigrants play an important, if unwitting, 
role in the long drive toward the reunification of Cyprus. That it may 
come someday at their expense is deeply ironic and sad.
Can there be no other way? Must warring people always find or cre-
ate a new enemy before they can join with their old one? Fortunately, 
a handful of individuals on the island have the courage and conviction 
to step forward and write about the immigrants’ humanitarian con-
cerns.34 One such individual is Sevgul Uludag, who challenges Turkish 
Cypriots to pay close attention to the physical and metaphorical “ghet-
tos” in which Turkish settlers frequently live. She writes:
And how do we ‘break’ these ‘ghettos’ to normalize life on this island 
so that what is called ‘the settlers’ would be treated like human beings, 
would not be used by the regime against the Cypriots and would ‘find’ 
themselves? How do we deal with this sensitive and humanistic issue 
within the boundaries of international law? How do we create space 
within our own identities and cultures to refuse ghettos but at the same 
time accept the differences? How do we combat racism and poverty?35
Mete Hatay echoes Uludag’s willingness to recognize Turkish 
immigrants as individuals and not merely as interchangeable parts 
of a whole. But he thinks it unlikely that the settlers can be more fully 
embraced by Cypriots, at least not without major changes in attitudes. 
He writes, “I’m not optimistic, because we still need to work on becom-
ing human beings, respecting non-Cypriots, we have to stop being the 
egotists of our own victimization.”36 Like Uludag and Hatay, only a 
few Greek Cypriots in the south are willing to pay the price for speak-
ing out on behalf of the immigrants. One writer of an unsigned opin-
ion piece in the Greek Cypriot newspaper Cyprus Mail demonstrated 
this courage:
What useful purpose is served by talking tough about the settlers? Apart 
from helping the anti-solution camp in the north, it also creates a nega-
tive climate between the two communities. Even if we cite the legal 
argument that the settlers are here as a result of a war crime, we cannot 
ignore the other legal argument—that after 20 years on the island they 
too have certain rights. Nothing is as simple and straightforward as the 
politicians would have us believe.37
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These writers serve to remind us that another way exists, and that 
the humanitarian concerns of our “enemies” need not be minimized 
due to the pain one’s own people have suffered. In another article 
about the settlers, Uludag illuminates the minimum conditions neces-
sary to overcome the fear of those who are different from us: honesty, 
openness to change, and recognizing the other’s humanity.
They have been used against the expression of the will of the Turkish 
Cypriots throughout the 30 years they have been here. But they also 
started changing and a considerable number of them wanting peace and 
a solution on this island. ‘Settlers’ are also human beings with problems, 
difficulties, families, kids…Perhaps we can learn to ‘treat’ them in a 
human way rather than talking of them as though talking of a bag of 
potatoes to be shipped back!…Whatever solution we find it should have 
a human face where both Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and what we 
call the ‘settlers’ can feel comfortable with.38
Cypriots have very good reasons for opposing the policies that 
brought Turkish immigrants into their midst. Articulating those rea-
sons or advocating changes to the policies is not racist. The ubiquity 
of anti-immigrant rhetoric and settler slurs warrant deep concern, 
however. Such talk dehumanizes the Turkish mainlanders and builds 
new barriers to resolving the Cyprus problem. The phrase “Cyprus 
problem” serves as shorthand for the well-known ethno-nationalist 
conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In this writer’s opinion, 
it is more accurate to refer to the range of immigrant-related issues and 
derogatory discourse discussed here as “Cyprus’ problems.” Cypriots’ 
experiences with ethnic conflict in the past fifty years seem to have 
done little to prepare them for the ethnic and multicultural challenges 
of our times. This is especially lamentable because it suggests that 
many more people will yet suffer on the island, that there will be con-
tinued calls to expel those who are most feared, and that new signs 
will be erected at the Larnaca airport. •
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